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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, ) 
Plaintiff and Respondent, . 
--vs.-
> ) TO}f?\f"f OTIS FAIR, Defendarn.t and Appellant. 
Case 
No. 9244 
BRIEF OF RESPONDEN'T 
ST1\TEl\IENT OF FACTS 
Appellant Fair was convicted January 20, 1960, in 
rr·hird District Court of unlawful possession of a nar-
cotic drug. He had competent counsel at the trial but 
now represents himself. The evidence showed Fair was 
visiting the Abyss, a Salt Lake City night club, when t'Yo 
police officers, acting on an informant's tip, approached 
him and asked him to step outside, where he "\vas searched 
and arrested. ( T. 24, 29) The officers found cigarettes 
which later proved to contain marijuana. He 'vas sen-
tenced to prison for the statutory term. 
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STATEMENT OF POINTS 
PoiNT I. 
APPELLANT'S CONVICTION SHOULD NOT BE RE-
VERSED BECAUSE OF THE MANNER OF HIS SEARCH 
AND ARREST BY THE POLICE OFFICERS. 
PoiNT II. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING 
APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR A BILL OF PARTICU-
LARS AS TO CERTAIN FACTS NOT INTRODUCED 
I~JTO EVIDENCE. 
PoiNT III. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN ITS IN-
STRUCTIONS TO THE JURY. 
PoiNT IV. 
JUROR RIGBY DID NOT INDICATE THAT HE 
\VOULD VOTE FOR A VERDICT PARTIAL TO EITHER 
SIDE. 
ARGU~IENT 
PoiNT I. 
APPELLANT'S CONVICTION SHOULD NOT BE RE-
\rERSED BECAUSE OF THE MANNER OF HIS SEARCH 
AND ARREST BY THE POLICE OFFICERS. 
Because of the language and style of appellant ~s 
brief, prepared 'vithout assistance of counsel, isolating 
the points relied upon has been difficult. Respondent has 
attempted to do so, ho,vever, and to ans,ver them in 
order. 
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The first point seems to be that appellant \vas im-
properly convicted in that he w·as accompanied from the 
night clnb to an alley and there searched by the officers, 
\Yithout a warrant, and arrested. (T. 24, 29) The search 
was an incident to Fair's arrest and was conducted almost 
simultaneously with it. (T. 31) 
Admittedly, there IS some law tending to require 
the arrest to be made prior to the search. If that is true 
in Utah and if the search and arrest are not to be deemed 
a simultaneous act, the search being incident to the arrest, 
appellant may possibly have a cause of action against 
the arresting officers; and the officers may be in technical 
violation of the law. However, none of the events that 
occurred can in any way invalidate the evidence, nor does 
the use thereof violate the Utah Constitution. 
The leading case in this matter is State v. Ai1ne,. 62 
U. 476, 220 P. 704, 32 A. L. R. 375. It "\Vas held thus that 
articles taken from an accused are not inadmissible in 
evidence against him because taken in violation of the 
constitutional provision of the Utah State Constitution. 
The court further held that the Fourth and Fifth Amend-
ments to the Federal Constitution do not apply to state 
governments or proceedings in state courts, and that the 
decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States as 
to admissibility of evidence under the Fourth and Fifth 
Amendments to the Federal Constitution are not binding 
on state courts in interpreting similar provisions of their 
own state constitutions. The court stated: 
"* * * we are led by the force of what \Ye deem 
the better reason to conclude with the vast major-
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ity of state courts that the admissibility of 
evidence is not affected by the illegality of means 
through which it has been obtained, * * *. '' 
As to its reasoning for this decision, the Utah court 
wrot~ as follows : 
"* * * The rule and the legal principles supporting 
it are stated in 4 Wigmore on Evidence, 2d ed. 
§ 2183, as follows: 'Necessity does not require, and 
the spirit of our law does forbid, the attempt to do 
justice incidentally and to enforce penalties by 
indirect methods. An employer may perhaps suit-
ably interrupt the course of his business to deliver 
a homily to his office boy on the evils of gambling 
or the rewards of industry. But a judge does not 
hold court in a street car to do summary justice 
upon a fellow passenger who fraudulently evades 
payment of his fare; and, upon the same principle, 
he does not attempt, in the course of a specific 
litigation, to investigate and punish all offenses, 
"\\rhich incidentally cross the path of that litiga-
tion. Such a practice might be consistent \Yith 
the primitive system of justice under an Arabian 
sheik, but it does not comport with our own sys-
tem of law. It offends, in the first place, by trying 
a violation of law without that due complaint and 
process which are indispensable for its correct 
investigation. It offends, in the next place, by 
interrupting, delaying and confusing the investi-
gation in hand, for the sake of a matter \Yhich is 
not a part of it. It offends further in that it does 
this unnecessarily and gratuitously; for, since the 
persons injured by the tnlpposed offense have not 
chosen to seek redress or punishment directly and 
immediately, at the right time and by the proper 
process, there is clearly no call to attend to their 
complaints in this indirect and tardy manner. The 
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judicial rules of evidence were never meant to be 
an indirect process of punishment. It is not only 
anomalous to distort them to that end, but it is 
improper (in the absence of express statute) to 
enlarge the fixed penalty of the law, that of fine 
or imprisonment, by adding to it the forfeiture of 
some civil right through loss of the means of prov-
ing it. The illegality is by no means condoned; it 
is merely ignored. For these reasons it has long 
been established that the admissibility of evidence 
is not affected by the illegality of the means 
through which the party has been enabled to obtain 
the evidence.' '' 
Notwithstanding whatever cause of action Fair may 
have or whatever liability, if any, may accrue to the offi-
cers, appellant's conviction on the basis of the seized 
evidence is valid and should not be overturned. 
PorNT II. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING 
APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR A BILL OF PARTICU-
LARS AS TO CERTAIN FACTS NOT INTRODUCED 
INTO EVIDENCE. 
Appellant Fair, through counsel, and by written 
motion, requested a. Bill of Particulars on January 5, 
1960, as to ''the names of all persons known to the prose-
cuting attorney or to officers Schoenhardt, Hann, Adair, 
Sperry, Kent or Park, or any of them, who claimed to 
have knowledge of defendant's alleged possession of 
marijuana prior to defendant's arrest on or about No-
vember 2, 1959." (R. 10) 
5 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Previously, on January 4, 1960, the judge had indi-
cated in response to an oral request by defendant's coun-
sel that he would not at that time require the district 
attorney to give the indicated information because of 
its immateriality in the case, but that defendant could 
file a formal motion for a Bill of Particulars by January 
6, 1960. (R. 9) 
After the January 4th hearing, the district attorney 
verbally and by· authorization of the court gave certain 
particulars of his case to defendant's attorney. 
Another hearing was held on January 11, 1960 (R. 
69), at which time the court considered the formal motion 
for a Bill of Particulars relative to the specific question 
raised above and again refused to require the district 
attorney to give defendant any information as to inform-
ants whose tips had led to arrest - again on the grounds 
of immateriality as to the charge \Yhich was brought under 
provisions of 58-13-2, U. C. A., 1953 as amended. There is 
no question that the judge was correct in not requiring the 
district attorney to answer extraneous questions which did 
not relate to any evidence introduced in the case and 
vvhich were not essential to the elements thereof. Here 
possession of the drug is the only element of the charge, 
and the police officers alone discoYered the drugs on his 
person. vVhy they searched him is not rna terial at all. 
This is in clear accord \Yith the statute providing for 
snch bills, 77-21-9, U. C. A. 1953. 
No testimony about or by any informer ""'as giYen by 
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the Htate at the trial and, therefore, the court's ruling was 
in all respects proper. 
If the defendant felt aggrieved by the judge's ruli~g, 
he should have made a motion to quash in accordance with 
the provisions of Title 77-23-3, U.C.A. 1953, and his fail-
ure to do so constituted a. waiver of the alleged defect. 
PoiNT III. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN ITS IN-
STRUCTIONS TO THE JURY. 
Appellant claims the court erred in its instructions 
to the jury. He does not point out the number of the in-
structions to which he objects and does not properly iden-
tify them in any other way. He refers to certain pages 
of the transcript, but such references do not deal with 
instructions at all, nor does he offer any worthwhile argu-
ments against the instructions as a whole. 
Respondent cannot answer this point because of the 
complete absence of information as to its nature. 
PoiNT IV. 
JUROR RIGBY DID NOT INDICATE THAT HE 
WOULD VOTE FOR A VERDICT PARTIAL TO EITHER 
SIDE. 
At T. 14, Juror Rigby made an inadvert slip of the 
tongue when asked if he could give an impartial decision. 
At line 18, he used the word "partial." Immediately, he 
recognized his error and corrected it without prompting 
to read, at line 20, ''impartial.'' 
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CONCLUSION 
Appellant has not suffered any prejudicial error. 
Due process has not been violated and his appeal should 
be dismissed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
WALTER L. BUDGE 
Attorney General 
VERNON B. ROMNEY 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Resp-ondent 
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